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China's Judiciary: An Instrument of
Democratic Change?
Graig R. Avino*
I.

Introduction

China's judiciary, although currently undergoing a process of
reform, remains too much an arm of the Communist Party to affect any
major democratic change in the immediate future. As a result of foreign
investment and increasing economic interest within mainland China, the
Communist Party has been forced to assemble a system of law to govern
economic transactions.' Although the Chinese government has made
tremendous progress in the realm of "economic law," the government
has done little to improve judges' ability to protect the basic human
rights of Chinese citizens.
This comment will first explore the roots of the Chinese approach to
law and the judicial process. In doing so, the comment will discuss
salient features of Confucianism and Legalism, two ancient ideologies
which continue to resonate in Chinese society and government. The
comment will then give a brief overview of the history of law in China
during the imperial (up until 1911) and the post-imperial periods (1911present).
The comment will then look to the structure of the present legal
system that was established after Mao's death in 1976. An analysis of
Chinese judges will follow, focusing on the judges' lack of independence
from the Communist Party, their propensity for corruption and their lack
of sufficient legal training. The comment then examines the Judges Law
of 1995, its positive and negative aspects, and its effectiveness in
reforming China's judges. The comment will close with a look at
official pronouncements by the State advocating judicial reform and the
* J.D. Candidate, Dickinson School of Law, 2004; B.A. in Politics, Washington &
Lee University, 2000. I would like to thank my family, especially my parents, for their
love and support throughout all my academic endeavors.
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recently implemented five-year reform plan.
Ultimately, even with the progress of the courts in the past twentyfive years, Chinese judges are still unable to affect major democratic
change. As a result of judicial supervision and traditional Chinese
suspicions about the adjudicative process, courts and judges must
undergo further reform before they can exert independence from the
Communist Party and function as an independent branch of government.
While recent attempts to improve the judicial system appear promising,
one can only hope that the suggested improvements materialize in the
twenty-first century.
Historical Background

II.
A.

Legalism and Confucianism

Before the advent of China's first imperial dynasty, two schools
dominated Chinese political, social, and legal thought: Legalism and
Confucianism. 2 Although Confucianism became the norm in Chinese
society and has greatly influenced culture and government, one cannot
understand Chinese law as it exists today without an understanding of
Legalism. Ultimately, the rejection of Legalism and the adoption of
Confucianism by the Chinese dynasties explain the general lack of
respect for courts and law in Chinese society.
The leading supporters of Legalism in ancient China were Shang
Yang (390-338 B.C.) and Han Fei (280-233 B.C.). 3 According to these
men and their followers, Chinese society could flourish only through the
universal application of penal laws that punished law-breakers with harsh
sanctions.4 Legalists advocated the use of fa (law), 5 which established
clear rules applicable to all without consideration of social rank.6 The
Legalists attempted to develop a system that would result in harmony,7
an idea central to traditional Chinese culture, 8 by encouraging the people

2.

Id. at 40.

3.

ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 8 (1992).

4. Robb M. LaKritz, Taming a 5,000 Year-Old Dragon: Toward a Theory of Leal
Development in Post-Mao China, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 237, 245 (2000).
5.

(1999).

STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 15

Literally, the word fa means "laws and institutions" or "the legal system."

Yuanyuan Shen, Understandingthe Complexity of Law Reform in Modern China, in THE
LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 20, 24 (Karen G. Turner et al., eds. 2000).
6. CHEN, supranote 3, at 8.
7. LaKritz, supra note 4, at 245.
8. Bobby K.Y. Wong, Chinese Law: TraditionalChinese Philosophy and Dispute
Resolution, 30 H.K.L.J. 304, 307 (2000).
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to understand and observe the law. 9 If this could be accomplished, law
would become the "authoritative principle for and... the basis of
government."' 0 China's first official dynasty, the Qin (221-206 B.C.),
utilized Legalist ruling theories throughout its reign." However, in 206
B.C., the Han dynasty seized power from the Qin, and the change in
governance marked the end of Legalism's primacy in China.12
With the end of Qin rule, the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220)
adopted Confucianism as its official ideology. 13 Confucianism stresses
the importance of persuasion, education, and moral example in
instructing individuals how to behave." 4 The concept of 1i (ethical
principles), which establishes a set of moral and social rules and
customs, was pressed upon society so people behaved according to their
conscience rather than out of fear of punishment.' 5
Central to
Confucianism is the theory that realization
of
these
core
concepts
would
6
stability.'
and
peace,
harmony,
in
result
Confucianism also posited the existence of a hierarchy throughout
Chinese society, with the Emperor, or the monarch, at the top. 17 In
general, rights and obligations between people varied with each
individual's place in society, and 1i (ethical principles) determined the
proper manner in which people were to treat each other.' 8 Relationships
and obligations of family members were the basis of society, and the
"same moral values and code of conduct prevailing in the family would
extend to society and the nation as a whole."' 19 In a sense, the nation was
viewed as an extended family.
All key relationships within the family and society were those of
9. LaKritz, supra note 4, at 245.
10. Id. (quoting DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MoRRis, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 19
(1967)).
11. LaKritz, supra note 4, at 245.
12. See id. at 245-46.
13. Id.
14. CHEN, supra note 3, at 8. Essentially, Confucianism acts as "a set of moral and
ritualistic norms for the regulation of human relationships." Id. at 9.
15. Id. Confucius contrasted the differences in his philosophy and the Legalist
philosophy: "Lead the people with orders, keep them in line with penal laws, and they
will avoid punishment but they will develop no sense of shame; lead them with virtue,
keep them in line with propriety and they will not only have a sense of shame but will
govern themselves." CHOW, supra note 1, at 41.
16. CHEN, supra note 3, at 10. Other important concepts of the philosophy include
jen (acting morally towards others) and i (understanding the existence of moral
obligations). Id. at 9.
17. See LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 16 (explaining that such a hierarchy established a
number of basic relationships-ruler/subject, parent/child, husband/wife, older
brother/younger brother, and friend/friend-that governed Chinese society and reinforced
the importance of concepts such as obedience and filial piety (devotion to the family)).
18. Wong, supra note 8, at 310.
19. CHOW, supra note 1, at 42.
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"superior to inferior with a general duty of obedience owed by the
inferior to the superior and a reciprocal duty of caring, support, and
guidance owed by the superior to the inferior., 20 Just as the concept of
hierarchy governed the relationship between father and son within the
family, the same concept governed the relationship between Emperor and
subject within the political system. 2' The Chinese people were expected
to demonstrate absolute loyalty to their Emperor, and in turn, the
Emperor was expected to "exercise his power benevolently and care for
his people. 22 The effectiveness of an Emperor thus rested on his "ability
to maintain, uphold, perpetuate and lead by virtue, morality and social
values. 2 3
In addition, Chinese society believed that the Emperor derived his
authority from a divine source, known as the Mandate of Heaven.24 As
the "Son of Heaven," the Emperor assumed a status above the law, and
attempts at limiting the Emperor's power were viewed as treason.25 The
Emperor had supreme legislative, judicial, and executive powers, and no
system of checks and balances existed.26 27In such a system, the "rule of
man" took priority over the "rule of law.",
In ancient China,fa (law) was a separate set of norms and inferior to
the Confucian values discussed above.2 8 Li (ethical principles) was the
primary tool used in ruling society, andfa (law) was only "invoked when
29
moral precepts could not sufficiently maintain social order.
Ultimately, "law was not an independent specialty but a part of the tools
of state administration in general., 30 As a result of 3Confucianism,
the
1
primacy of law was never accepted in Chinese society.

20. Id. at 43.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 44.
23. LaKritz, supra note 4, at 244. The Emperor was expected to set a good moral
example for his subjects to follow. CHEN, supra note 3, at 11.
24. CHOW, supra note 1, at 45.
25. Id. at 46.
26. Id.
27. CHEN, supra note 3, at 11. Although the concept of the mandate of heaven
disappeared at the beginning of the 20 th century, the author of this comment asserts that
the "rule of man" did not disappear with the ascendancy of the Communists, as
exemplified by the arbitrary rule of Mao Zedong.
28.

LUBMAN,SUpra note 5, at 14.

29. CHOW, supra note 1, at 49. In some periods of Chinese history, officials decided
cases in accordance with Confucian principles, and simply overlooked statutory laws. Id.
30. Id. at 50.
31. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 14. This differs markedly from western society, where
law is viewed as the primary tool in ruling the populace.
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B. Imperial History
For the remainder of China's imperial history, the concepts of li
(ethical principles) andfa (law) survived, but the importance of the latter
was significantly limited. As time went on, Chinese ruling dynasties
realized the practical need for a system offa (law), but they did so only
because they realized that the Confucian principle of moral guidance
could not alone produce good behavior.32 Ruling dynasties took the view
that "law, while necessary, should principally be used to supplement and
reinforce the lessons to be obtained from the [Confucian] teachings and
guidance."3 3

Although both the Qin and Han dynasties had comprehensive legal
codes, the oldest surviving code is that of the Tang dynasty (618-706
A.D.).34 The Tang code acted as a model for subsequent codes of the
Song (960-1269), Yuan (1271-1368), Ming (1368-1644) and Qing
(1644-1911) dynasties.3 5 The codes were premised on the ideas that all
people were not equal and that law was to maintain the traditional social
order as dictated by Confucianism. 3 6 Such codes acted as penal codes
that were principally concerned with punishment of wrongdoing.37
Although law in imperial China was inferior to Confucian
principles, courts still existed to punish those who violated the penal
codes and to deal with civil disputes.3 8 Basic political subdivisions,
known as counties, were governed by magistrates, imperial officials who
acted as judges 39 and who were responsible for overseeing prosecutions
and litigation. 40 These officials also acted as the region's chief
administrator and highest police official. 41 Due to the intermingling of
the magistrates' roles, "there was no formal separation of judicial powers
from other powers, and no developed doctrine of judicial
independence. 42 With no concept of an independent judiciary, high32.

Wong, supra note 8, at 308 (quoting G.

MACCORMACK,

THE SPIRIT OF

TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 7 (1996)).

Id.
CtEN, supra note 3, at 12.
Id.
LaKritz, supra note 4,at 246.
37. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 23.
38. See CHOW, supra note 1, at 50-51.
39. Id. at 13. Similar to judges in present-day China, magistrates had no special
legal training, and became judges by virtue of "their general duties to govern on behalf of
the emperor." LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 23.
40. Id.
41. Id. "The county magistrate would simultaneously exercise administrative, police
and judicial powers over the locality and the same structure combining all these powers
was true for magistrates at the higher levels of the. prefecture, province, and the capital."
33.
34.
35.
36.

CHOW, supra note 1, at 50.

42.

Id.
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ranking officials in the imperial system were not only encouraged to
supervise the magistrates, but were directed to exert pressure to force
them to decide cases in certain ways, oftentimes regardless of the penal
codes.43
Aside from the courts' lack of independence, traditional Chinese
' 4
litigation was described as "time-consuming, costly, and degrading. "
Magistrates were often corrupt, cruel, and lazy, and relied on their clerks
and underlings to handle the bulk of litigation. 45 Trials were expensive
and humiliating to participants, and parties and witnesses were tortured
in the hope of forcing confessions. 6 Pursuing formal litigation in
imperial China was unpromising, as exemplified by the
Chinese saying:
47
"to enter a court of justice is to enter a tiger's mouth.,
"The perils of litigation, widely publicized in popular lore,
undoubtedly restrained many persons from bringing suit" before the
magistrate. 48 As a result, the majority of disputes were resolved through
informal mediation conducted by the leaders of clans, villages, and
guilds.49 Mediation proceedings were conducted,"in accordance with
customary rules and prevailing notions of morality, which stressed
harmony. 5 ° Ultimately, these proceedings were so favored by the
populace (over litigation) that local village leaders often required parties
to "exhaust their remedies within the group" before going to the
magistrate.5 '
In addition to the practical problems associated with litigation,
Chinese society disfavored litigation because it was in conflict with the
52
basic Confucian precept that disputes should be avoided at all costs.
Confucian principles asserted that disputes violated the harmonious
social order believed to exist in Chinese society. 3 As a result, when
disputes arose, the Chinese ignored vindicating their rights, 54 and instead
focused on saving face (i.e. preserving one's integrity and dignity) and

43.

CHOW,supra note 1, at 50.
LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 24.
45. Id. at 23. Further, litigants were often exploited by these underlings, who
obtained their incomes by charging fees to those who decided to resolve disputes through
litigation. Wong, supra note 8, at 306.
46. CHEN, supra note 3, at 14. Those who attempted to appeal a ruling often had to
undergo beatings before their case was heard. Id.
47. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 24.
48. Id.
49. CHEN, supra note 3, at 12.
50. Id.
51. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 25.
52. Wong, supra note 8, at 306.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 310.
44.
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resolving the dispute quickly through mediation. 55 Two proverbs further
illustrate this disrespect for litigation: "It is better to die of starvation
than to become a thief;- it is better to be vexed to death than bring a
lawsuit;" and "Those who live' 56
do not want to go to court; those who are
dead do not want to go to hell "
Chinese law and government remained in this form, with minor
variations as new dynasties assumed power, until the end of the 19 th
century. However, events such as the Taiping Rebellion of 1851-1864,
the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and the
western powers' intrusion into China influenced the then-reigning Qing
dynasty to pursue reforms in law and government. 57 In 1902, the
Empress Dowager decreed that two of her ministers should undertake the
task of reforming China's law codes "to bring them into accord with the
conditions resulting from international commercial negotiations. 58
However, such reform efforts were cut short when the Qing were
overthrown in 1911 by the Chinese Nationalists (KMT) who went on to
establish the Chinese Republic.5 9
C. Post-ImperialHistory
In the period from 1911-1949, the KMT that ruled China attempted
to westernize the nation's laws. 60 Although China adopted new law
codes and established a western based bar and court system, most
individuals in the vast Chinese countryside were unaffected by the
changes. 6 1 After Japan's invasion of China in 1937, the KMT's reform

55. LUBMAN,supra note 5, at 26.
56. Wong, supra note 8, at 306.
57. See JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE
LAW, ITS NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT 17-18 (1999).
58. Id. at 18. In order to undertake such reform, the Empress Dowager's ministers
established a Law Codification Commission in 1904 and considered establishing a
constitutional monarchy modeled after Japan's system. Id. It is interesting to note that at
the turn of the 2 0th century, Chinese imperial officials were most concerned with bringing
the country's legal system into conformance with standard commercial practices. Oddly
enough, Communist officials in China today appear to be interested in the same issue at
the turn of the 2 1 st century. In both instances, officials failed to stress the importance of
changing laws to assure basic human rights to the populace.
59. CHEN, supra note 3, at 21.
60. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 31. However, China was not nominally unified under
the KMT until 1928, so it was only after this date that official efforts were taken to
rewrite and reorganize China's laws. Id.
61. Id. at 32. Reasons for the failure can be traced to the fact that most Chinese
counties had no courts or could not understand how to implement such changes. Id.
Chinese judges were sparse and poorly educated, and corruption and favoritism was as
wide spread as it had been in imperial times. Id. Thus, while this period at least may
demonstrate an evolution in Chinese ideas about law, little was done to implement the
reforms in reality. See id.
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efforts were forgotten as they united with the Chinese Communists and
focused on ousting the Japanese invaders.62 Before proceeding any
further, a brief introduction to the Chinese Communists is appropriate.
The Communist Party of China (CPC) was founded in 1921 and
began to attract new members throughout the decade.63 In 1931, the
Party instituted the Chinese Soviet Republic in Jiangxi province and
promulgated the Constitutional Program of the Chinese Soviet
Republic.64 At this time, the Marxist concept of using law as a tool to
remold society, to suppress class enemies and to enforce party policy
rather than to protect individual rights became doctrine.6 5 Justice was
politicized, class distinctions were made in enforcing justice and mass
trials for political indoctrination were introduced.6 6 Such features
became an important part of the "lawless" Communist system that
existed under the rule of Mao Zedong from 1949-1976.
After the joint efforts of the KMT and CPC ousted the Japanese
invaders from the mainland, China became embroiled in a civil war,
which ended with the CPC defeat of the KMT in 1949.67 In February of
1949, the Communists abolished the laws of the KMT regime and on
October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong, the Chairman and leader of the CPC,
announced the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC). 68 In
1954, the National People's Congress (the legislature of the Republic, a
puppet of the CPC) drafted and passed the nation's first official
constitution. 69 Further, courts and procuratorates were set up throughout
China, and in 1956, Liu Shaoqi, President of the Republic (his power
was nominal, Mao had complete control),
noted the necessity of
70
establishing a "complete legal system.
After these "golden years" of law reform, the rule of law was
replaced by the rule of man as Mao began to monopolize his control over
the country. In 1956, the Party announced the policy of "letting a
hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend,"
which encouraged the Chinese people to express their opinions on
supra note 57, at 33.
supra note 3, at 22.
CHEN, supra note 57, at 32-33. Most provisions of the document were copied
from the 1918 Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, and it laid
out the basic state power structure which was to be the basis for later Chinese
Constitutions. Id at 33.
65. Id. at 34.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 35.
68. CHEN, supra note 3, at 24.
69. Id. at 26.
70. CHEN, supra note 57, at 38, (quoting the SELECTED WORKS OF Liu SHAOQI 253
(1985); Liu's speech is entitled "The Political Report of the Central Committee of the
CPC to the Eight National Congress of the Party").
62.
63.
64.

CHEN,
CHEN,
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Communist rule. 7 1 After receiving strong criticism from intellectuals, the
Party ended the policy, and launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign that
attacked these vocal critics.7 2
The campaign greatly damaged the developing concepts of legality
in China, and after 1957, the prestige of legal institutions fell, law
schools taught politics rather than law and many courts were merged
with the police or prosecutorial organs of Chinese society.73 During the
Great Leap Forward of 1958-1961, China's leadership attempted to
modernize the country through radical economic reform, industrialization
and the implementation of Soviet farming techniques.74 At the same
time, the Party leadership emphasized that concepts such as legality,
judicial independence, and equality of citizens before the law were
bourgeois and of no use to a proletarian nation.75
However, the Great Leap Forward failed, and China briefly
embraced rational economic reform, during which time the Communist
Party advocated the need for law and social order.76 However, all such
hopes were abandoned in 1966 when Chairman Mao proclaimed the
beginning of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution., 77 Although the
precise reasons for this movement are unclear, it appears to have resulted
from a power struggle in the Communist Party's leadership between such
pragmatists as Liu Shaoqi and the ideological Mao.78 By appealing to a
cult of personality, Mao mobilized the support of China's youth behind
him and eliminated his opponents. 79 From 1966-1969, the country was
in a state of civil chaos, as officials and cadres of the Party were branded
as counterrevolutionaries and persecuted by Red Guards, Chinese youths

71. CHEN, supra note 3, at 28.
72. Id. During the campaign, over one hundred thousand Chinese were branded as
Rightists and sent to farms in the countryside to undergo reeducation through labor. Id.
Many jurists, lawyers and judges, who had been some of the most outspoken critics of
Communist rule, were among the first victims of the Anti-Rightist campaign. Id. The
Party leadership accused these individuals of using the law to oppose the Party or of
opposing the Party by stressing the independence of the judiciary. Id. at 29.
73. Id. at 29.
74. CHOW, supra note 1, at 15-16. The implementation of Soviet faming techniques
and problems associated with it led directly to a famine which resulted in the death of
some 20 to 30 million Chinese. See id. at 15.
75. Wang Chenguang, Introduction: An Emerging Legal System, in INTRODUCTION
TO CHINESE LAW 1, 11 (Wang Chenguang et al. eds., 1997).
76. CHEN, supra note 57, at 39. In fact, even Chairman Mao Zedong was reported as
saying, "law was needed-not only a criminal code, but also a civil code." Id., (quoting
Gu ANGRAN, SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGISLATIVE WORK 102 (1989)).
77. CHEN, supra note 3, at 29.
78. Id. at 29-30. The pragmatists wanted to modernize China through rational
management while Mao advocated strict adherence to Communist ideology and
continuing revolution in order to achieve a utopian classless society. Id.
79. Id. at 30.
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who were utterly devoted to Mao. 80 Any remaining laws of the country
were "literally abolished," law schools were closed and Mao's
pronouncements were believed to be the only source of law.81
The horrors of the Cultural Revolution subsided after several years,
but the general spirit of the rule of man persisted in China until Mao's
death in September 1976.82 After Mao's death, however, Deng Xiaoping
and other pragmatists seized power from the ideologues and
implemented a program of reform. 83 Deng initiated his "Two-Hands"
policy, in which Chinese society was urged to develop the economy on
the one hand, and to strengthen the legal system on the other hand.84 For
the most part, China has followed this dictate, and although human rights
violations are still commonplace, the nation now has a thriving economy
open to foreign investment and a legal framework in which economic
problems can be resolved.
As a result of history, China's judiciary never developed as an
independent and respected branch of government as in western nations.
Due to Confucianism, the traditional Chinese fear of litigation,
preference for mediation, and Mao's destruction of the legal system, the
idea of an independent and efficient judiciary is one that is entirely novel
to most Chinese. As China becomes an integral part of the worldwide
economic market and subject to stricter scrutiny by trading partners and
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), there is reason to
believe that China will be forced to transform and modernize its
judiciary. As will be demonstrated below, although such a process of
reform has begun in the economic realm, there is reason to doubt the
sincerity of such efforts in the human rights realm in light of the
continued grip of the CPC on Chinese society.

80. Id. The Red Guards were primarily responsible for the chaotic state of China
during the time of the Cultural Revolution. Id. Some scholars estimate that nearly 100
million people were subject to persecution at the hands of the Red Guards during this
time. Id.
81. Chenguang, supra note 75, at 12. "The Chinese people were urged to be guided
by Chairman Mao's thought instead of law." CHEN, supra note 1, at 32.
82. CHEN, supra note 3, at 33. The month following Mao's death saw the arrest of
the Gang of Four, ultra-leftists who had controlled China with Mao up until his death. Id.
83. Id. In fact, Deng is quoted as saying, "In order to safeguard people's democracy,
the legal system must be strengthened. Democracy needs to be institutionalised and
legalised so that such a system and such laws would not change merely because of a
change of leadership or a change in the leaders' views and attention." Id. (quoting DENG
XIAOPING, COLLECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING 136-37 (1983)).
84. CHEN, supra note 57, at 40.
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III. The Judicial System of the People's Republic of China
A.

The Role and Structure of Courts in the PRC

According to the latest Chinese Constitution, the people's courts are
the judicial organs of the state. 85 Although such courts are to exercise
judicial power independently, free from interference by "administrative
,,86
th
in reality, the "people's
organs, public organizations or individuals,
courts are subordinate to the people's congresses at each level. 8 7 The
people's courts have four levels: the Supreme People's Court at the
national level, high courts at the provincial level, intermediate courts at
the prefecutural level, and basic courts at the local level (county and
city). 88 These courts consist of criminal, civil, economic, or enforcement
divisions. 89
The judges who staff these courts include the court's president and
vice-presidents, while each division is comprised of a chief judge and
associate chief judges.90 Court presidents, vice-presidents, chief judges,
and associate chief judges are appointed and removed by the people's
congresses at the same jurisdictional level, 9' and the standing committees
of the corresponding people's congresses appoint other judges.9 2 Such
an appointment process coincides with the Constitution's mandate that
the courts are responsible to the people's congresses at the corresponding

85. P.R.C. CONST., ch. III, sec. 7, art. 123 (1982),
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2.
Another component of the judicial
system are the people's procuratorates, the state organs for legal supervision, which
approve arrests made by public security organs; directly investigate a number of criminal
cases; exercise supervision over the courts in criminal cases by appealing their rulings;
and supervise the legality of the actions of public security organs and prison authorities.
CHEN, supra note 3, at 124-25.
86. P.R.C. CONST., supra note 85, at ch. III, sec. 7, art. 126. At the same time,
however, Article 128 of the Constitution states that the Supreme People's Court "is
responsible to and shall report on its work to the National People's Congress and its
Standing Committee." CHOW, supranote 1, at 196.
87. CHOW, supra note 1, at 195.
88. Chenguang, supra note 75, at 23. Besides these courts of general jurisdiction,
there are also "specialist courts," such as military courts, railway transport courts, and
maritime courts. CHEN, supra note 3, at 108. There are about 30,000 people's tribunals
in towns and villages (which are established by the basic people's courts to provide
additional access to the court system); 3,000 basic people's courts at the county level;
390 intermediate people's courts in cities and prefectures within provinces; and 31 high
level people's courts at the provincial level. CHOW, supra note 1, at 201.
89. Wang Guiguo, The Legal System of China, in CHINESE LAW 1, 15 (Wang Guiguo
ed., 1999).
90. Chenguang, supra note 75, at 23.
91. CHOW, supra note 1, at 202.
92. CHEN, supra note 3, at 109.
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level of jurisdiction.9 3 Ultimately, judges in China are without the tenure
enjoyed by United States judges and their terms of service do not differ
markedly from other state officials.94
A collegiate bench of three, five, or seven judges hears cases that go
to trial, and membership on these collegiate benches fluctuates for each
trial. 95 Although the judges on the bench deliberate and come to a
decision, in certain situations their decision is not final until it has been
96
reviewed and approved by the particular court's judicial committee.
This committee is generally composed of the court's president and other
experienced judges, and its primary responsibilities are to discuss and
decide important or difficult cases, to make decisions concerning other
judicial matters and to review the experiences of judges.9 7 If the
members of the committee reach a different decision than the members
of the collegiate bench, the members of the bench are bound by law to
follow the decision of the judicial committee.9 8
B. Judges in the People's Republic of China
Since the late 1970s, Chinese judges have typically been drawn
from a pool of retired military officers with no legal background, 99 so
few lawyers or individuals with legal experience are judges today. 10 0
The reason for selecting judges from the military has been based on the
fact that such judges do not exercise power independently,' 0 ' and they
are prone to follow dictates from the CPC without question. In fact,
Chinese judges are often praised for their devotion to the Party and their
role in protecting the interests of the State. 10 2 In a telling quote, a judge
of peasant origin who had served in the People's Liberation Army (PLA)

93.

P.R.C. CONST., supra note 85, at ch. III, sec. 7, art. 128.
CHEN, supra note 3, at 109.
95. Chenguang, supra note 75, at 24. A collegiate bench also may consist of judges
and several people's assessors. Id. These assessors are regular Chinese citizens
appointed or invited to participate in trials and who have the same functions and authority
ofjudges when sitting on a collegiate panel. Id.
96. CHEN, supra note 3, at 111.
97. Chenguang, supra note 75, at 24. Members of this committee are appointed by
the standing committees of the people's congresses at the corresponding level. Id.
98. Id.
99. Robert Marquand, New for China's Courts: Trained Judges, Standard Rules,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 16, 2001, http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0816/pls3woap.html.
100. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 256.
101. See Marquand, supra note 99. Stanley Lubman concludes that such former
military officers were "good candidates for judgeships because they, like police, had been
engaged in enforcing proletarian dictatorship and possessed the appropriate ideological
outlook on their work." LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 253.
102. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 256.

94.
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and who became a judge upon demobilization noted, "I am a lucky
fellow among tens of thousands of peasant children. I am grateful to the
Party for its nurture and education, so I will never slacken my efforts in
whatever work the Party assigns me to do. 1 °3
Thus, although the Chinese Constitution notes that courts are to
exercise judicial power independently, in practice, judges follow the
dictates of the Party leadership. 10 4 One Chinese law professor has
observed, "[the court] often reports... to the local Party Committee and
solicits opinions for solution.., and if contradictions arise among
different judicial organs, the Party's political legal committee often steps
forward to coordinate." 10 5 These political-legal committees, which are
established by the CPC, exist at all levels within the PRC judicial system
to ensure that courts and judges act in accordance with Party dictates.10 6
Political-legal committees include the head of the public security organ,
the president of the people's court, the president of the people's
procuratorate, the head of the judicial administrative organs, and the head
of the 7administrative organ for civil affairs at the provincial or local
10
level.
Although these committees undoubtedly interfere with the work of
judges, the degree of interference is uncertain. Although during the early
years of the PRC judges would often ask the committees for instructions
on how to rule in individual cases, one commentator suggests that
"recent practice has been for the Party to set overall policy guidelines
[through the committees] and to avoid direct involvement in the review
of individual cases." 10 8 Whatever the degree of interference exercised by
these committees, the Communist Party continues to exert influence in
the judicial process, through the appointment of leading judicial officers
and through the issuance of documents that become a part of the internal
handbook ofjudges. 10 9
103. Id. at 257, (quoting He Weifang, The Realization of Social Justice through
Judicature:A Look at the Current Situation of Chinese Judges, in TOWARD A TIME OF
RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 209, 249 (Xia
Yong, ed., 1995)).
104. Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years, 20
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383, 394 (2000).
105. Id. at 395, (quoting He Weifang, The Realization of Social Justice through
Judicature:A Look at the Current Situation of Chinese Judges, in TOWARD A TIME OF
RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 209,249 (Xia
Yong, ed., 1995)).
106. CHOW, supra note 1, at 197-98. These political-legal committees are different
from the judicial committees discussed above, although each body limits the
independence of individual judges.
107. Id. at 198.
108. Id.
109. Id.at 199. A good illustration of the control of the Party on the judicial system
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Judges are also constrained from acting independently because of an
"ideology of supervision" which mandates that the Supreme People's
Court, upper-level judicial officers, the procuracy, the people's
congresses and the masses have the power to oversee the work of
judges," ° and even reopen a final judgment if it is believed that some
serious error was made."' In fact, such supervision is seen as vital in
realizing the rule of law by ensuring fair legal judgments, checking
12
corruption and punishing those judges who overstep their authority.
The concept of supervision is essential to an understanding that the
courts' role in China has traditionally been viewed as that of an
administrative bureaucracy, which is expected to strictly enforce the law
and not to meddle in the affairs of other branches of government." 3 In
addition, Chinese legal theory treats judges not as individuals with
independent powers of final adjudication
but as necessary components of
114
the judicial system as a whole.
Besides the grip of the Party on the courts and the concept of
supervision, other reasons exist as to why Chinese judges do not exercise
power independently. Most importantly, Chinese judges are often
subject to bribery and other forms of corruption from local officials who
control their appointment, salaries, and financial resources."' Judges are
subject to bribery from parties to litigation as well, who may offer lavish
bribes or attempt to engage in ex parte communications with the judge
who is to hear their case." 6 One author has even reported that some
judges collude with parties to "create fake cases involving fake plaintiffs,
fake defendants, fake bids, fake evidence, fake legal representation and
fake trials."' ' 7 Part of the reason for such widespread corruption in the
is that when the president of the Supreme People's Court speaks before the National
People's Congress, he acknowledges that his court "carries out its work under the
leadership of the Party Central Committee." Id. at 220-21.
110. Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese Courts, in
THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 163, 178 (Karen G. Turner et al., eds. 2000).
111. CHOW,supra note 1, at 213.
112. A Duty Delegated by People, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 23, 2001,
http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn/news/cn/2001-2-23/html. The article also asserts that the
National People's Congress and its local organizations should undertake the task of
supervision seriously, strengthening their supervisory powers if necessary. Id. However,
it should be noted that the China Daily Newspaper is put out by the Chinese government
and printed in English. There is a chance that articles in the paper contain government
propaganda.
113. Woo, supra note 110, at 182.
114. Id. at 179. "Indeed, according to Chinese legal theory, judicial independence
refers to the independent adjudication of the court as a whole, not of the individual
judge." Id.
115. LUBMAN,supra note 5,at 278.
116. CHOW,supra note 1,at 222.
117. Xin Chunying, What Kind of JudicialPower Does China Need? 1 ICON 58,61
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past had been the lack of a comprehensive code of judicial ethics, and
1 18
although the Supreme People's Court issued such a code last year,
enforcement in many areas of China is impossible.' 19
Corruption also abounds because Chinese society and Confucianism
demand that harmony be achieved through the maintenance of proper
relations. 120 Thus, it is common for Chinese judges to accommodate
their decisions in cases "to maintain good relationships with powerful
persons, institutions or companies."' 121 The use of such relationships (or
guangxi) to influence judicial outcomes is so common that Chinese
judges often refer to cases whose results were influenced by a
relationship as "guangxi cases.' 22
Most Chinese judges lack legal training, and most were appointed
for political reasons. 23 As a result, many judges lack confidence in their
abilities and prefer to decide cases through mediation in order to avoid
reversal by a higher court. 124 Consultation among Chinese judges is
common, and judges only decide cases on their own when the cases are
of little or no significance. 125 As noted above, a judicial committee of
senior judges often decides difficult or important cases, and lower courts
126
sometimes request instructions from higher courts on how to rule.
Thus, the general lack of legal education of Chinese judges leaves many
of them without the ability or confidence to make rulings that affect
major democratic change. The situation led the current president of the
Supreme People's Court, Xiao Yang, to note that "[c]ourts have often
been taken as branches of the government, and judges viewed as civil
servants who have to follow orders from superiors, which prevents them
from exercising
mandated legal duties like other members of the
127
judiciary."'
(2003).
118.
119.

CHOW, supra note 1, at 202.
See LUBMAN, supra note 5,at 279.

120.
121.

Id.
Id. (quoting Susan Finder, Inside the People's Courts: China'sLitigation System

and the Resolution of Commercial Disputes, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE PRC: A

63, 69 (Asia Law and
Practice, 1992)).
122. Lubman, supra note 104, at 396.
123. China
Vows
to
Overhaul
Courts,
BBC
NEWS,
July
8,
2002,http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/2115571.stm.
Chinese media has
reported that more then two thirds of Chinese judges do not have a college degree. Id.
Also, former military officers were generally instructed only in "basic legal knowledge"
and "legal practice" in spare time training courses instituted by the individual courts.
LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 253.
124. Lubman, supra note 104, at 397.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. China Vows to Overhaul Courts, supra note 123.
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION IN CHINA
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Finally, most judges enter the profession by passing a qualifying
examination, and if the judges are not selected from the military, they are
still recent graduates of college or law school who can be easily
influenced to implement the Party's wishes. 128 The inexperience of
judges, and the fact that they are viewed as administrators in a legal
system where the National People's Congress and its Standing
Committee enact and interpret laws, hampers their independence and
prestige. 129 Even today, the role of judges has been limited to "the
straightforward and mechanical application of the law to identify the
correct solution," which involves little legal reasoning or judicial
discretion.' 30 Judges are not paid well either, as they only make about
U.S. $240 per month, which is equivalent to the salary of civil servants
and mid-level bureaucrats.'31
C. The Judges Law
In 1995, China issued a Judges Law, which, for the first time,
established minimum, uniform qualifications for judges. 3 2 While
China's judiciary is subject to many of the shortcomings described
above, this new law, and other efforts at reform may indicate that there
are attempts being made to establish an independent and modem
judiciary. Although enforcement of all provisions of the law remains a
problem 133 and the law itself contains negative aspects, in the future, this
law may become the means for judges to assert a level of independence
and begin to effect changes in Chinese law and society.
Chapter I, Article I of the Judges Law notes that the law was
enacted to enhance the quality of judges, to ensure that courts exercise
their judicial power independently and to ensure that judges perform
their functions in accordance with the law. 3 4 Chapte[, Article 7 lists
the obligations and rights of judges, stating that judges must observe the
Constitution and laws; decide cases impartially based on the facts and the
law; safeguard the lawful rights and interests of the citizens; abide by
discipline; and avoid corruption. 135 Article 8 of the same chapter
reiterates the constitutional mandate that judges are to be free from
interference from "administrative organs, public organizations or
128. See CHOW, supra note 1, at 203.
129. Id. at 204.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 254.
133. See id. at 256.
134. JUDGES LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id= 102.
135. Id. at ch. III, art. 7.

OF CHINA,

ch. I, art. I (P.R.C.),
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136
individuals" and are required to receive training.
Chapter IV of the Judges Law establishes minimum qualifications
for becoming a judge in the PRC. 137 As mentioned above, such a
provision is of great importance because qualifications for judges had
never been previously established in China. 38 Article 9 of Chapter IV
requires that judges must be of Chinese nationality; must have reached
the age of 23; must endorse the Constitution of the PRC; must have "fine
political and professional quality and [] be in good conduct;" must be in
good health; and must. have an advanced degree specializing in law 139
or
must have worked for one or more years if they have a college degree.
In addition, the law requires all judges who do not possess the above
qualifications to receive 40training to attain those qualifications within a
specified period of time. 1
For the first time ever, there are minimum requirements of
education and expertise in order to rise to the level of judge in China.
Besides improving the skill of judges, the existence of qualifications may
ensure that, in the future, judges will no longer be selected from the
military on the basis of their loyalty to the CPC. Further, the fact that
judges now are required to have a legal education may result in increased
respect from the public and a view that courts are not administrative
bodies, but, as noted by the Constitution and Judges Law, independent
and separate branches of China's government.' 4 1 Along with increased
respect, judges may be less prone to corruption and the local influences
that have traditi6nally hampered their functions and legitimacy.

136. Id. at ch. III, art. 8.
137. Id. at ch. IV. Stanley Lubman notes that formal training programs for judges (of
one to three years) hai ,e been established at Beijing University and People's University
by the Supreme People's Court. In addition, a Judicial Training College was established
in Beijing in 1997. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 253.
138. "Prior to 1983, the only qualification for being a judge at any level was that the
person must have reached the age of twenty-three, must be eligible to vote, must be able
to stand for election to public office, and must not have been previously deprived of any
political rights." CHOW, supra note 1, at 203. In 1983, China added the requirement that
judges needed to have some "professional legal knowledge." Id.
139. JUDGES LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 134, at ch. IV, art.
9. Chapter V, Article 12 notes that "[p]ersons to be appointed judges or assistant judges
for the first time shall be selected through public examination and strict appraisal, from
among the best qualified for the post, and in accordance with the standards of having both
ability and political integrity." Id. at ch. V, art. 12. The law also notes that those who
have a Master's Degree of Law or Doctor's Degree of Law may not be subject to the
requirements regarding the number of years worked. Id. at ch. IV, art. 9.
140. Id.
141. See Rule of Law Progresses Steadily in China, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 12, 2002,
http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn/news/cn/2002-11-12/html.
The article quotes VicePresident of the Supreme People's Court, Cao Jianming, as stating that judicial
departments are playing an increasingly important role in China and are becoming a
focus of the public. Id.
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At the present time however, little has been done to appoint judges
with the minimum qualifications described above. Although the public
emphasis on recruiting former military officials as judges declined with
the enactment of the Judges Law in 1995, one Chinese scholar
complained in 1998 about the "persistence of placing demobilized
soldiers in the courts as judges.' 4 2 Further, "demobilized soldiers are
singled out for commendation in performance of judicial duties, when
compared with university and college graduates, and their
accomplishments are often described using militaristic imagery. When
judges with formal education are commended, they [are] praised for
'work-style' and dedication rather than for ...experience or legal
knowledge.' 4 3 Ultimately, although Chinese judges continue to be
selected from the military after passage of the Judges Law, one can only
hope that further interaction with western nations will force the Chinese
government to appoint qualified judges in accordance with the law in the
future.
Chapter III of the law urges judges to rule in accordance with law
and to protect the rights of citizens. At the same time, Chapter III,
Article 7 codifies the concept of judicial supervision by other judicial
bodies and the masses. 44 Article 7 encourages judges to "keep State
secrets and the secrets of judicial work," and to safeguard the interests of
the State. 145 In fact, Chapter X, Article 28 of the law rewards judges for
safeguarding the interests of the State and for protecting State secrets. 4 6
Codification of such principles is a danger to the court system, as it
forces judges to accept supervision and to maintain the secrecy of an
authoritarian state. Such provisions illustrate the fear of the CPC in
allowing judges to gain independence from the Party, and tend to
dampen the positive aspects of the Judges Law. :Such provisions
illustrate the traditional Chinese distrust of judges and the public
litigation process in general. Ultimately, such provisions placed between
those guaranteeing judicial independence and impartiality of judges leads
one to question the value of the Judges Law, and to consider whether the
law is "window dressing designed to keep investment
levels high and to
47
satisfy World Trade Organization" observers.
Another section of the Judges Law that deserves consideration is

142. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 257. (quoting He Weifang, Fuzhuan junren (newspaper
article)).
143. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 256.
144. JUDGES LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 134, at ch. III, art.
7.
145. Id.
146. Id. at ch. X, art. 28.
147. Marquand, supra note 99.
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Chapter VIII. In general, the section asserts that judges shall be
appraised annually and impartially by the masses and by the leaders of
the judges' courts. 148 The appraisal is based primarily on the judges'
achievements in judicial work, but also on their ideological levels, their
legal and judicial competence and the manner in which they conduct
themselves on the bench. 149 The appraisal will result in a grade of
excellent, competent, or incompetent,0 and will be the basis for award,
punishment, promotion, or dismissal.15
Such an appraisal system has both positive and negative
implications for China's judiciary. First, because China's judiciary is
developing, one could argue it is necessary to have such a system of
review to assess the progress of judges and to determine whether further
reforms need to be implemented in order to achieve an independent and
modem judiciary. In addition, the appraisals themselves force the judges
to follow the mandates of the Judges Law and to work hard, as a poor
appraisal rating can result in dismissal and a high appraisal rating can
result in promotion. In this sense, the appraisal system is a necessary
component of a law meant to enhance the quality of judges.
At the same time, however, the appraisal system has negative
implications. First, it should be noted that judges are appraised partially
on the basis of their ideological level. One can safely assume that, in this
context, ideological level means adherence or agreement with the
policies of the CPC. By making this concept one of the bases of
evaluation, the CPC has forced judges to comply with its dictates in
order to receive a high appraisal rating. If a judge decides to assert a
level of independence and promote democratic concepts, he could be
ridiculed or given a poor appraisal rating.
The appraisal system is also suspect because it is undertaken by
other members of the judge's court and the ordinary citizens of the
locality. While other judges may be competent to appraise judges on the
basis of their achievements in judicial work, it is absurd to believe that
the mostly uneducated peasantry of China could undertake a competent
review of judicial work (or be given the opportunity to do so). Even if
the people of the locality are indeed given a chance to appraise judges,
many may base their appraisal of judges on personal factors and
Confucian ideals, resulting in unfair appraisals. Also, because the
appraisal is undertaken by local, rather than national officials, the bribery
and corruption the law claims to curtail may become evident.

148. JUDGES LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 134, at ch. VIII,
art. 20.
149. Id. at ch. VIII, art. 21.
150. Id. at ch. VIII, art. 22.
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Finally, Chapter XI, Article 30 of the Judges Law deserves mention
in that it outlaws particular actions judges may undertake. Under the
law, judges are prohibited from spreading "statements damaging the
prestige of the State" and from "taking part in such activities as
assembly, procession and demonstration against the State."'' 51 Such a
provision impedes a judge's ability to issue rulings that contradict the
dictates of the CPC or promote democratic ideals, as such rulings could
be interpreted as damaging the prestige of the State. This provision
highlights another way in which the Party exerts control over the actions
of their cadres.
The Judges Law is positive in that it establishes a uniform law to
govern the behavior and qualifications of judges. However, such
positive provisions are overshadowed by negative provisions which
stress that judges are "soldiers of the state" and must decide cases in
accordance with the dictates of superiors. The negative aspects may lead
one to the troubling conclusion that the law itself is a sham established in
order to allow China to enter the WTO and to trade freely with western,
democratic nations.
Whatever the case, one can conclude that at least some progress has
been made, since a Judges Law would have been unthinkable under the
arbitrary rule of Mao. Even if the Party leaders passed the law to
appease foreign observers and it remains under-enforced for the next
several years, it still exists.' 52 Such provisions as those requiring
qualifications for judges may actually result in an educated judiciary that
may be willing to take chances and ignore the dictates of the Party.,53
Although a conflict with the Party would certainly result in dismissal of
the judge in today's China, in the future, judges may accumulate enough
prestige and power to butt heads with the Party leaders. While the
Judges Law may have positive implications for the future, at present,
little has been done by judges to assert their independence and avoid the
control of the Party.
D. FurtherExamples ofJudicialReform
In recent years, Chinese government officials have begun to speak
publicly about the need for reform of China's courts and judges. 5 4 At
151. Id. at ch. XI, art. 30.
152. Chunying alleges: "China is a country that worships theory, and laying the
theoretical and conceptual groundwork of reform has been a major step." Chunying,
supra note 117, at 62.
153. In fact, Chunying has suggested that China's judiciary has embraced reform
efforts, "eager to improve its public image and credibility and meet new social demands."
Chunying, supra note 117, at 60.
154. See Marquand, supra note 99 (explaining that in 2000, "for the first time, a
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the fifteenth national Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1997,
then-president Jiang Zemin noted the need for "judicial reform and
providing systematic guarantees for the judicial organs to exercise power
independently and openly."' 155 Jiang's statement was the first time in
PRC history that the Communist party explicitly advocated judicial
reform in official documents.' 56
In October of 1999, the Supreme People's Court formulated an
outline of reform designed to bring about a fair, clean, and efficient
judicial system, known as the Five-year Plan. 57 One of the focuses of
the plan is to decrease the authority of the judicial committees and
increase the independence ofjudges. 58 According to the plan, except for
very important and difficult cases that should be submitted to the judicial
committees, the collegiate bench and independent judges should decide
all cases, without influence or advice from the presidents of the people's
courts. 159 Although this is a step in the right direction, it is still the

judicial committee that has the power to decide which cases are
important or difficult, and in those cases, "the judicial committee can still
decide the judgments behind closed door[s].,' 160 Further, the politicallegal committees still exist, and continue to exert influence over how
courts make decisions. Thus, although the plan promises to increase the
independent power of adjudication of judges, it has only done so in a
limited sense.
In addition, the plan requires people's courts to institute a judges'
selection system which will select judges of higher courts from the
"most-qualified judges of lower courts, or high-performance lawyers, or

lawyer was appointed chief justice [president] of the Chinese Supreme People's Court,
China's highest court).
155. Chunying, supra note 117, at 59.
156. Id.
157. Wong Kai Shing, CHINA: Reforming China's Judiciary, August 17, 2001,
http://www.ahrchk.net/hrsolid/mainfile.php/2001 vol 11 OnoO6/555/.
The
Supreme
People's Court Outline states:
[O]ptimizing the organizational structure of the people's courts by closely
focusing on the need to develop a socialist market economy and build a
socialist rule-of-law country, and by following the basic principles stipulated
by the Constitution and other laws; further improving the independent, just,
open, effective, clean, and well-operating adjudication mechanism; creating a
contingent of high-quality judges under a scientific management system;
establishing a budget management system that can fully ensure the fulfillment
of the adjudication function of the people's courts; and truly building up a
socialist judicial system with Chinese characteristics.
Chunying, supra note 117, at 63.
158. Id.
159. Id.

160.

Id.
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other high-level professionals." 161 The plan also notes that newly
recruited judges should gain experience in intermediate people's courts
16
or basic people's courts before moving on to higher positions. 1
However, the plan makes no mention of removing the external influence
over courts exerted by local governments or of more thorough reforms to
secure the right to a fair trial. 163 Thus, just as with the Judges Law,
although the Five-year Plan encourages the formation of an independent
judiciary, in reality, the reforms proposed by the plan are minimal at
best.
On January 31, 2000, the Supreme People's Court issued a
regulation meant to eliminate instances in which judges would face a
conflict of interest. 64 Such a regulation is consistent with statements
made by government officials noting the Party's intent to crackdown on
corruption and other of the aforementioned guangxi problems that
hamper China's judges. This is most aptly illustrated by a statement
made by Xiao Yang, president of the Supreme People's Court, who in
March of 2000 told the Third Session of the National People's Congress
that the Chinese government was attempting to crackdown on the
corruption that is evident in China's courts. 165 The attempt to crackdown
on corruption intensified after that statement, when in 2001, the Supreme
People's Court enacted the Basic Code of Professional and Ethical
Conduct for Judges. 166 At the time of the publication of this comment, it
is unclear exactly how effective such attempts have been.
Finally, in a move that appears to be an attempt at improving the
prestige of judges both in the eyes of the Chinese public and the
international community, certain judges now have been given new
titles. 167 Under the new system, the president of the Supreme People's
161. Id. Related to this reform effort is the Provisional Measures for Selecting the
Presiding Judges of People's Courts, promulgated by the Supreme People's Court in July
2000. Chunying, supra note 117, at 67. "The goal of the Measures is to improve the
status of judges and generally synchronize their powers and duties." Id.
162. See Shing, supra note 157.
163. Id. The author suggests, as a way of decreasing local influence and Party control
over judges, vesting the appointment power in an independent judicial service
commission; guaranteeing tenure to judges; and abolishing the judicial committees.
164. Id.
165.
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11,

2000,

http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn/news/cn/2000-3-11/html. In his speech, Xiao asserted
that corrupt judges, who have been bribed or who have embezzled public funds, will not
be spared. Id. In fact, Chow reports that "[a]ccording to the Supreme People's Court,
law enforcement officials investigated and punished 995 judges and judicial personnel for
corruption in 2001." CHOW, supra note 1, at 222.
166. CHOw, supra note 1, at 222.
167. Judicial Independence Bolstered by China's Grand Justice System, THE
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Mar.
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http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200203/22/eng20020322_92618.shtml.
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Court is now referred to as chief grand justice, while vice-presidents and
members of the judicial committee of the Supreme People's Court and
presidents of provincial-level higher people's courts will be given the
68
title of grand justice after appointment by the Supreme People's Court. 1
Grand Justice Shan Deyong, vice-president of the Supreme People's
Court, stated: "Compared with the [administrative] titles of president or
vice-president of a people's court, the new honor stresses the pursuit of
judicial equity, neutrality, equality, independence and probity of
judges."1' 69 Ultimately, the government claims that the move is intended
to bring Chinese courts closer to international practices, and in turn,
closer to an independent judiciary. 70 However, it is hard to believe that
the Party's alleged goals can be accomplished by simply referring to the
judges with new titles.
China's sincerity in attempting to reform its judiciary through
official statements and regulations must be questioned. At this moment,
it is clear that the government has established a court system that can
effectively resolve economic disputes, but the government has done little
in practice to improve the judiciary's ability to ensure justice to China's
citizens. However, just as with the Judges Law, at least reform efforts
appear to have begun in a limited sense, and this may open the door for
true and effective reforms in the future. However, at present, the CPC
does not appear willing to allow for the establishment of an independent
and modern judiciary.
IV. Conclusion
What can be concluded from the foregoing discussion is that
although China is moving down the right path in modernizing and
educating its judiciary, the movement is still fairly new and needs time to
truly take root in society. Passage of the Judges Law and official
statements about improving the judiciary and implementing the rule of
law are encouraging, but the reform movement must overcome
significant barriers in both Chinese society and government to be truly
successful. These barriers include the traditional Chinese fear of
litigation, the lack of a history of judicial independence, the lack of
respect for law as a result of Confucianism and the rule of Mao Zedong,
and an authoritarian government and Communist Party attempting to
resist democratic change. Thus, while China is proceeding down the
right path, the judiciary is still too much an arm of the CPC to effectuate
any major change in the near future. What happens beyond that future,
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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however, is still to be seen.

[Vol. 22:2

